




























Parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector within the European Union 
Summary (Conclusion) 
 
The pharmaceutical market is a complex market. It is characterised by high 
levels of price and supply regulation, high sunk costs, and the key role played 
by patents and innovation in driving competition. Price disparity within the 
market leads to the possibility of arbitrage, whereby parallel traders will take 
that opportunity by exporting legally acquired pharmaceutical products from 
low price Member States to high price Member States, without the consent of 
the manufacturer. This opportunity exists because internal market rules, as 
interpreted by the European Court of Justice, dictate that Member States cannot 
restrict trade based on the existence of different regulatory regimes. 
 
Pharmaceutical companies argue that there are, in essence, several geographical 
pharmaceutical markets within the European Union. Each Member State has its 
own market, with its own regulatory characteristics. Pharmaceutical company's 
ability to profitably sell their products at low price countries is undercut if 
parallel traders are allowed to exploit arbitrage opportunities without 
manufacturers being able to act to deter such activities. This may lead them to 
be forced to leave such markets altogether, or to invest less in R&D. 
 
The European Commission, and others, including Member States that believe 
they benefit from parallel trade, argue that there is a single market in 
pharmaceuticals, and that public restraints on trade cannot be replaced by 
private restraints on trade. Pharmaceutical companies enjoy considerable 
bargaining power during price negotiations with public authorities, too, and 
there is no causal link between decreased revenues resulting from parallel trade 
and a loss of incentive to conduct research in such an innovative market. 
 
The European Courts determined, in Adalat, that an agreement concerning an 
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export ban is anticompetitive, but could not find such an agreement within the 
context of that case. It was not enough that combining obligations to supply on 
the part of the wholesalers with supply quotas imposed by Bayer had an effect 
similar to that of an export ban, as the Courts could not find any meeting of the 
minds between Bayer and its wholesalers. 
 
In Syfait, AG Jacobs opined that the pharmaceutical companies had a good 
point, and that the internal market in pharmaceuticals was being partitioned by 
lack of regulatory harmonisation, not through the conduct of pharmaceutical 
companies. He also considered that the consequences of unmitigated parallel 
trade would undercut a regulatory regime that aimed to maintain a constant 
supply of medicines available to the population of the EU. Pharmaceutical 
companies should not bear the burden of connecting a partitioned market, and 
doing so may lead to an even more fragmented market in the end. 
 
In Syfait II, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer disagreed with AG Jacobs. He pointed to 
the considerable bargaining power of pharmaceutical companies during price 
negotiations, as well as to their freedom to decide on their distribution systems. 
He also noted the favourable conditions that exist within the EU for an industry 
that focuses on R&D, as well as the fact that competition within the 
pharmaceutical sector is driven by innovation, which is an incentive in itself for 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in R&D. 
 
The European Court of Justice attempted to strike a balance between, on the 
one hand, the single market imperative and, on the other hand, a dominant 
firm's capacity to protect its legitimate commercial interests. It ruled, citing its 
own relevant case-law, that a dominant undertaking was only forced to maintain 
ordinary supply to its longstanding customers, and that it was for national 
courts to determine whether that was the case. In addition, national courts also 
had to take into account how supply obligations applied to manufacturers and to 
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distributors in coming to their decision of whether or not conduct by a dominant 
firm constituted an abuse of a dominant position. 
 
The ECJ also imposed on Member States the burden of addressing any supply 
shortages arising from parallel trade. As was noted above, an LSE study found 
that such action was taking place, as Member States with lower prices have 
been taking action to address the issue of parallel exports, though always taking 
care not to run afoul of internal market rules. There have also been efforts on 
the part of the European Commission to promote the creation of common 
guidelines on price regulations, as mentioned in note 15 above. 
 
Though the ECJ ruled, in GlaxoSmithKline, that agreement that has as its 
purpose the restriction of parallel trade is anti-competitive by object, even in the 
had found that the Commission had not adequately assessed whether or not 
rent) Article 101(3) 
TFEU. In other words, while dual pricing restricts competition by object, it may 
not be as difficult to justify that restriction as a means of regaining efficiency 
lost due to the regulatory structure that underpins the pharmaceutical market. 
The General Court, at least, seemed very open to the possibility, which will 
101(3) TFEU much harder. 
 
Ultimately, differing views on parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in the European 
Union are based on fundamentally different ways of looking at cost-bearing due 
to lack of regulatory harmonisation and also on the bargaining power of 
pharmaceutical companies and Member States when negotiating price levels. 
Different vantage points lead to strikingly different conclusions on the issue of 
supply quotas and parallel trade, in particular when it comes to whether or not a 
refusal to supply constitutes abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU. 
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Ultimately, the European Court o
deference to its own preference, should hold strong for many years, unless there 
are drastic changes in the regulatory environment within the European Union. 
 
At a time of financial turmoil, when Member States attempt to cut costs across 
the board, while still attempting to salvage their ability to provide 
pharmaceutical products at affordable prices to their citizens, such drastic 
changes are not outside the realm of possibility. Until any such changes take 
place, however, low price Member States will have to come up with ways of 
addressing the issues raised by parallel trade, and dominant pharmaceutical 
firms will need to take care in how they attempt to apply supply quotas to low 
price markets. While doing so will not necessarily result in an agreement under 
Article 101 TFEU, it is possible to result in a finding of abuse of dominance 
under Article 102 TFEU. 
 
Time will tell what balance will in the future be struck between the need to keep 
health care costs low, achieve universal coverage, protect intellectual property 
rights, and maintain the structural integrity of the single market. It should be no 
surprise that, when people's health is at stake, any choices made will not be 
easy.  
 
